China’s Crisis Management in the 1958 Quemoy Crisis

Shao-Cheng Sun

Tamkang University

ABSTRACT

  Since 1949, the Government of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to Taiwan due to the Chinese Communist victory over the Nationalist forces. There were three major military conflicts across the Taiwan Strait: the first Taiwan Strait Crisis–from 1954 to 1955, the 1958 Quemoy Crisis, and the 1996 Missile Crisis. Among them, the 1958 Quemoy Crisis particularly draws the most worldwide attention, due to the scale of China’s military attacks and the United States’ (U.S.) intervention. By understanding the decision-making and crisis management of Chinese leaders during the Quemoy Crisis, it will enhance our understanding of how China makes their military decisions, and how Taiwan can take a feasible approach in countering any possible future Taiwan Strait military crisis. Hence, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: 1) What were the objectives of the Chinese leaders in launching the artillery shells against Quemoy? 2) What were the China’s military strategies and crisis management during the crisis to achieve the objectives?

Keywords: Rational decision, objectives, strategy, and Quemoy Crisis